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INTRODUCTION

In City of Brainerd v. Brainerd Investments Partnership, 1 the
Minnesota Supreme Court considered whether the State was a
property owner in the context of the State’s special assessment
statutes. 2 By answering the question affirmatively, the court
discounted over seventy years of reliance on attorney general
opinions that said the State was not an “owner” under the statute. 3
The decision solidified the State’s right to petition a municipality
†
JD Candidate, William Mitchell College of Law, 2014; BS, University of
Minnesota- Twin Cities, 2004. Thank you, Miguel Cisneros, for keeping the family
on track while I read all day. William A. Blonigan, thank you for being the best
attorney mentor a daughter could ask for.
1. 827 N.W.2d 752 (Minn. 2013).
2. Id. at 753. For an example of a special assessment statute defining
“owner,” see M INN. STAT. § 429.031, subdiv. 1(f) (2012).
3. The original special assessment statute was interpreted in a 1936 attorney
general opinion. After the Minnesota Legislature consolidated the statute and
recodified it in 1953, it was again interpreted by the attorney general. See infra Part
II and notes 21, 29.
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for improvements payable by special assessment, even though
municipalities lack statutory authority to bind the State to pay those
assessments. 4 The court’s decision correctly relied on the rules of
statutory construction by finding that the term “owner” in the
statute was unambiguous. Yet the decision draws attention to
important policy considerations that may compel the legislature to
amend the statute, perhaps to prohibit the State from petitioning
for special assessments, or alternatively, to allow municipalities to
bind the State to pay for special assessments. 5
First, this case note will summarize the historical background
of Minnesota Statutes section 429.031 6 and outline the facts of
Brainerd Investments Partnership. 7 Next, it will explore the court’s
holding and will agree that the court correctly concluded that
compelling policy arguments and longstanding extrinsic
interpretations do not nullify the court’s duty to interpret statutes
according to the law. 8 It will also examine how, in addition to
creating the potential for the State to oblige its neighbors to pay
special assessments for projects petitioned for by the State, the
State’s immunity from special assessment creates a source of
financial uncertainty and instability for municipalities that
undertake large infrastructure projects at the request of the State. 9
Finally, it concludes that this decision highlights important policy
considerations that impact all owners of property abutting stateowned land and, therefore, the legislature should consider
changing Minnesota’s special assessment statutes to protect both
private landowners and municipalities from their omnipotent state
neighbor. 10
II. HISTORY OF RELEVANT LAW
Special assessments in Minnesota are a constitutional creation.
They defray the cost of local improvements that confer special
benefits on certain property by requiring contribution from the
owners of the property abutting such improvements. 11 They are
4. M INN. STAT. § 435.19, subdiv. 2; Brainerd Invs. P’ship, 827 N.W.2d at 753.
5. See infra Part IV.
6. See infra Part II.
7. See infra Part III.
8. See infra Part IV.
9. See infra Part IV.
10. See infra Part V.
11. M INN. CONST. art. X, § 1 (“The legislature may authorize municipal
corporations to levy and collect assessments for local improvements upon property
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distinct from other forms of public works funding in that they are
used to finance specific local improvements. They may only be
levied against properties that receive a measurable special benefit
from the improvement, such as improved access to a road, and the
amount of the charge is directly related to the benefit to the
property. 12 However, municipalities cannot bind the State to pay
special assessments, even if the improvement benefits the stateowned property. 13
Under Minnesota law, if the owners of at least thirty-five
percent of the property abutting a proposed improvement submit a
petition in favor of funding the improvement by special
assessment, 14 a municipality can pass the resolution to fund the
improvement by a simple majority. 15 This means that if one owner
owns thirty-five percent or more of the total front footage abutting
the assessment and that owner petitions for the improvement, the
city council may approve the resolution by a simple majority, even
if all other abutting owners disapprove. 16 Absent such a petition, a
four-fifths majority is required. 17 This is known as the thirty-five
percent rule. This procedure applies whenever a municipality
intends to finance improvements, even partially, by levying special
assessments. 18
The statute governing the thirty-five percent rule was first
enacted in 1927 19 and has been clarified and amended over the
years. 20 In 1936, the Minnesota Attorney General issued an opinion
to the City of New Ulm in which he stated that “the city is not an
‘owner’ . . . within the meaning of the . . . statutory provisions and
benefited thereby without regard to cash valuation.”).
12. M INN. STAT. § 429.051 (2012); LEAGUE OF M INN. CITIES, INFORMATION
M EMO: SPECIAL ASSESSMENT GUIDE 2 (2011), available at http://www.lmc.org/media
/document/1/sagtext.pdf.
13. M INN. STAT. § 435.19, subdiv. 2.
14. Id. § 429.031, subdiv. 1(f).
15. Id.
16. See id.
17. Id.
18. Id. § 429.021, subdiv. 3 (“When any portion of the cost of an
improvement is defrayed by special assessments, the procedure prescribed in this
chapter shall be followed . . . .”).
19. See Act approved Apr. 14, 1927, ch. 185, § 1, 1927 Minn. Laws 279, 279
(“In any city of the fourth class . . . the council shall have power to improve any
street . . . when petitioned for by the owners of not less than thirty-five percent (35%) in
frontage of the real property abutting on such street . . . .”).
20. M INN. STAT. § 429.031 (amended 1953, 1955, 1957, 1961, 1963, 1965,
1967, 1973, 1984 (four amendments), 1986, 1994, 1996, and 2000).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2013

3

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 11

2013]

A STATUTORY DEFINITION OF “OWNER”

359

[city] . . . property should be excluded by the city authorities in
determining the sufficiency of the petition.” 21
In 1949, the language of the 1927 statute 22 was transplanted
into a newly reorganized chapter dedicated to special assessments.23
In 1953, it was incorporated into the current special assessments
chapter. 24 There is no record of the legislature expressing
disagreement with the 1936 attorney general opinion, 25 and the
1953 version of the statute did not define “owner.” 26 The following
year, the attorney general issued two more opinions interpreting
“owner” in the newly consolidated statute. 27 The first of these two
opinions answered a related question about the same statute and
relied almost entirely on the 1936 opinion. 28 In that letter the
21. Cities & Villages—Streets—Improvement of, 56 Op. Minn. Att’y Gen.
133, 134–35 (June 30, 1936). In this opinion, the attorney general relied on the
following foreign precedent: Herman v. City of Omaha, 106 N.W. 593, 595 (Neb.
1906) (stating that “the right to petition should be confined to the individual
taxpayer who bears the greater part of the burden imposed by the special
assessment,” and holding that the city did not have the right to petition itself);
Armstrong v. City of Ogden, 43 P. 119, 121 (Utah 1895) (holding that the city’s
property should not be included in calculations to determine whether a petition
for special improvements had been signed by the requisite number of votes).
22. Act approved Apr. 14, 1927, ch. 185, sec. 1815, § 1, 1927 Minn. Laws 279,
279 (repealed 1949).
23. Act effective July 1, 1949, ch. 119, § 51, 1949 Minn. Laws 146, 177
(repealed 1953).
24. See Act approved Apr. 17, 1953, ch. 398, § 3, 1953 Minn. Laws 465, 468;
City of Brainerd v. Brainerd Invs. P’ship, 827 N.W.2d 752, 762 (Minn. 2013).
25. See Brainerd Invs. P’ship, 827 N.W.2d at 762.
26. See M INN. STAT. § 429.031 (2012); M INN. STAT. § 412.411 (1949) (repealed
1953); Brainerd Invs. P’ship, 827 N.W.2d at 762. The recodification was part of the
consolidation of several statutes pertaining to special assessments and was
intended to create an integrated chapter on the topic from a plethora of related
laws spread throughout the Minnesota Statutes. The appellants contended that
these circumstances justified deference to the attorney general’s opinions. In their
brief, they stated in part:
The Attorney General’s opinions are especially important, because
they bracket in time the comprehensive consolidation of Minnesota’s
special assessment statutes . . . . [T]he drafters of Chapter 429 included
a task force of experienced municipal practitioners . . . . If they had
wanted to change that rule they surely would not have left the pre-1953
language unamended.
Appellants’ Brief, Addendum and Appendix at 21, Brainerd Invs. P’ship,
812 N.W.2d 885 (No. A11-644, -1471), 2011 WL 7807383.
27. Special Assessments—Property Owned by the State, 408-c Op. Minn. Att’y
Gen. 1, 1–2 (Oct. 28, 1954); Cities: Improvements—Sewer, 387-B-10 Op. Minn.
Att’y Gen. 1, 1–5 (June 29, 1954).
28. Cities: Improvements—Sewer, 387-B-10 Op. Minn. Att’y Gen. at 1–5
(stating in reference to the attorney general’s opinion of 1936, “Upon its
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attorney general concluded that, in determining the adequacy of a
petition to make improvements, it was not necessary to consider
city-owned property. 29
A few months later, the attorney general again weighed in on
how the statute applies to state-owned property. 30 This last opinion
echoed the previous opinions and concluded that the State was not
an owner within the meaning of the statute because the city could
not require the State to pay special assessments. 31 Therefore,
according to this opinion, state land was not considered in
calculating whether there was sufficient landowner support for a
petition, and the State was not eligible to petition “for or in favor of
the improvement.” 32
Since 1954, the statute has been amended fifteen times. 33
In two of those amendments, the legislature addressed the
meaning of the word “owner.” In 1961, the legislature added a
provision strengthening notice requirements for owners, defining
“owner” for the purpose of mailed notice, and explicitly
acknowledging tax exempt owners as owners deserving of notice. 34
In 1967, the provision defining “owner” enacted in the 1961
amendment was rewritten; however, the explicit acknowledgment
of tax exempt owners remained intact. 35 Additionally, a 1996
authority, your first question is answered in the negative”).
29. Id. at 4.
30. Special Assessments—Property Owned by the State, 408-c Op. Minn. Att’y
Gen. at 2.
31. Id. (“Since the property of the State abutting upon the street named as
the location for the improvement is not subject to a special assessment for the
improvement contemplated it is my opinion that [the State] is not an ‘owner’
within the requirements of 429.031 . . . .”); see also Cities: Improvements—Sewer,
387-B-10 Op. Minn. Att’y Gen. at 4; Cities & Villages—Streets—Improvement of,
56 Op. Minn. Att’y Gen. 133, 135 (June 30, 1936) (interpreting M INN. STAT. § 1815
(Mason 1927)) (“[T]he city is not an ‘owner’ of such abutting park property
within the meaning of the . . . statutory provisions . . . .”).
32. Special Assessments—Property Owned by the State, 408-c Op. Minn. Att’y
Gen. at 2.
33. See supra text accompanying note 20.
34. Act effective Jan. 1, 1962, ch. 525, § 5, 1961 Minn. Laws 910, 913
(inserting three sentences requiring notice be mailed to owners of parcels within
the proposed assessment area not less than ten days before a hearing, defining
“owners” for the purpose of mailed notice as those shown as of thirty days prior to
the adoption of the resolution providing for the hearing, and providing a special
procedure for identifying tax exempt owners and obtaining waiver of notice by tax
exempt owners).
35. See Act approved Mar. 10, 1967, ch. 57, § 1, 1965 Minn. Laws 136, 136
(amending the 1961 provision defining owner for the purpose of mailed notice by
deleting the thirty-day qualification).
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amendment made several changes to the wording of the statute
apparently aimed at modernizing the language and improving
clarity. 36 In 2013, the Minnesota Legislature proposed, but did not
pass, an amendment to section 435.19. The amendment would
have given municipalities the ability to bind the State to pay
assessments, while allowing the State to maintain its ability to
negotiate the amount it would pay. 37 Additionally, the amendment
would have required the State to appropriate a set amount of funds
each year to pay special assessments levied against the State. 38
There was an additional proposal to appropriate $2 million in the
form of a reimbursement grant to the City of Moose Lake. 39
For reasons explained in Part IV, this proposal passed.
III. FACTS OF THE CASE
The appellants, Roger and Elizabeth Anda, 40 and James
Martin, own several apartment buildings located across College

36. See Act of Apr. 2, 1996, ch. 402, § 1, 1996 Minn. Laws 542, 542–43.
For example, this amendment changed “[n]ot less than 10 days before the
hearing, notice thereof shall also be mailed to the owner of each parcel within the
area proposed to be assessed” to “[n]ot less than 10 days before the hearing,
notice of the hearing must also be mailed to the owner of each parcel within the
area proposed to be assessed.” Id. The amendment also changed “[f]or the
purpose of giving mailed notice, owners shall be those shown to be such on the
records of the county auditor” to “[f]or the purpose of giving mailed notice,
owners are those shown as owners on the records of the county auditor.” Id.
37. S.F. 552, 88th Leg., Reg. Sess. art. 2, § 33, subdiv. 2 (Minn. 2013).
This proposed amendment would have required the city to determine the amount
that would have been assessed had the public land been privately owned and,
although the State would have retained its ability to pay an amount less than the
amount determined by the city, the last two sentences of the current version,
which prohibit a municipality from binding the State by assessments, were
eliminated. Id.
38. Id. art. 2, § 34, subdiv. 6(a) (“There is annually appropriated from the
general fund and credited to the agency assessment account in the special revenue
fund, $5,000,000 in fiscal year 2014 and each year thereafter. Money in the agency
assessment account is appropriated annually to the commissioner of revenue for
grants to reimburse instrumentalities, departments, or agencies for payment of
special assessments, as required under subdivision 2.”).
39. Id. art. 2, § 34, subdiv. 6(b).
40. Roger and Elizabeth Anda own land and businesses around the State of
Minnesota and have been involved in other real estate related litigation, including
a recent case that also reached the Minnesota Supreme Court. See Moorhead
Econ. Dev. Auth. v. Anda, 789 N.W.2d 860, 866 (Minn. 2010). That case
considered issues related to eminent domain and reimbursement for mitigation of
contaminated soil. See id.
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Drive from Central Lakes College (CLC) in Brainerd, Minnesota. 41
In 2008, the Brainerd City Council began to explore the possibility
of expanding College Drive due to increased traffic. 42 The Council
proposed a combination of funding sources for the project,
including federal stimulus funds and state-aid funding. 43 The
project also required local cost sharing, but the Council was
opposed to the use of general tax revenues. 44 Instead, some
members of the Council proposed the use of special assessments on
adjacent properties to meet the local contribution requirements. 45
The Council lacked the requisite four-fifths majority to pass
the resolution without a petition and could not invoke the thirtyfive percent rule because no petition was forthcoming. 46 The city
engineer sent a letter to the vice president of administrative
services for CLC to inquire whether CLC, an entity of the State,
would consider submitting a petition for the improvements. 47
Although CLC did not make a firm financial commitment at that
time, the vice president expressed willingness to submit a petition
and pay a portion of the special assessments. 48 On November 15,
2010, CLC formally petitioned the Council, and on December 6,
2010, the Council approved the resolution by a four-to-three vote. 49
Though CLC had not committed to an exact dollar amount at the
time of the Council’s vote, CLC and the city maintain that CLC
made a financial commitment prior to the vote. 50
41. Appellants’ Brief, Addendum and Appendix, supra note 26, at 1.
42. Id. at 4.
43. Id. at 5.
44. Id.
45. Id. In the spring of 2008, the city engineer recommended against special
assessments because, in his opinion, “the proposed project [was] being driven by
increasing regional traffic demand in the corridor, not the adjacent land
uses . . . .” Id.
46. Id. at 5–7.
47. Id. at 6; see also City of Brainerd v. Brainerd Invs. P’ship., 827 N.W.2d 752,
754 (Minn. 2013) (stating that the State owns over thirty-nine percent of the
property abutting the project area).
48. Respondent’s Brief and Appendix at 6, Brainerd Invs. P’ship, 812 N.W.2d
885 (No. A11-644, -1471), 2011 WL 7807384 (stating that CLC was in favor of the
improvements because of the focus on improving safety).
49. Brainerd Invs. P’ship, 827 N.W.2d at 754.
50. Respondent’s Brief and Appendix, supra note 48, at 7. Respondents
stated on the record that the petition represented CLC’s agreement to pay the
assessment. Id. at 7. The final assessment amount totaled $359,882.80. On
December 17, 2009, CLC sent a letter to the City specifically agreeing that the
improvements would benefit the College and agreeing to pay the assessment. Id. at
7–8. CLC further asserts that it waived its right to challenge the assessment as
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In response to these events, the appellants initiated an
injunction action, claiming the petition was invalid. 51 The
appellants argued that the State was not eligible to petition for
improvements because it could not be bound to pay special
assessments and, therefore, was not an “owner” within the meaning
of the statute. 52 Both parties filed motions for summary judgment.
The district court granted the City’s motion, concluding that the
word “owner” was unambiguous and the State was an “owner”
eligible to petition, and dismissed the appellants’ claims. 53 The
court of appeals affirmed, holding that “owner” must be “construed
according to the rules of grammar and ‘common and approved
usage.’” 54
The supreme court affirmed the court of appeals, relying on
Minnesota Statutes section 645.0855 and the dictionary definition of
the word “owner.” 56 The court concluded that it was not necessary
to consider the attorney general opinions or legislative history to
determine the meaning of the statute because the statute was not
ambiguous on its face. 57 Because the ambiguity threshold was not
met, the court declined to consider extrinsic sources. 58
excessive or demand hearings, and that it budgeted for the assessments pursuant
to section 435.19, subdivision 2 of the Minnesota Statutes. Id. at 7–8; accord
Brainerd Invs. P’ship, 827 N.W.2d at 754 n.2.
51. Brainerd Invs. P’ship, 827 N.W.2d at 754.
52. Id.; see also M INN. STAT. § 435.19, subdiv. 2 (2012).
53. Brainerd Invs. P’ship, 827 N.W.2d at 755.
54. Id. (citing City of Brainerd v. Brainerd Invs. P’ship, 812 N.W.2d 885,
891–92 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012)).
55. M INN. STAT. § 645.08(1) (“[W]ords and phrases are construed according
to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage; but
technical words and phrases and such others as have acquired a special meaning,
or are defined in this chapter, are construed according to such special meaning or
their definition.”).
56. Brainerd Invs. P’ship, 827 N.W.2d at 756; see BLACK’ S LAW DICTIONARY 1214
(9th ed. 2009) (defining owner as “[o]ne who has the right to possess, use, and
convey something”).
57. Brainerd Invs. P’ship, 827 N.W.2d at 753 (“Because we conclude that the
State is an ‘owner’ of property under the plain language of the statute, we
affirm.”); see also id. at 756 (“The Legislature did not make any distinctions among
owners in section 429.031, subdivision 1(f) . . . . Moreover, the Legislature has
demonstrated that when it intends to treat property owned by the State differently
from privately-owned property, the Legislature knows how to make the distinction
clear.”). See generally M INN. STAT. § 645.16 (“When the words of a law in their
application to an existing situation are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter
of the law shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the spirit.”).
58. Brainerd Invs. P’ship, 827 N.W.2d at 757; see M INN. STAT. § 645.16.
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The dissent, however, argued that the plain language of the
statute, when analyzed in the context of the statute as a whole,
“clearly establishe[d] that the State is not an ‘owner’ under the
35 percent owner rule.” 59 Specifically, the dissent pointed out that
subdivision three of the same provision, which governs the
requirements of a “unanimity petition,” 60 requires that the owners
signing the petition agree to pay the full cost of the project. 61
Accordingly, the majority’s interpretation would create two
inconsistent interpretations of the word “owner” in the same statute
and, therefore, by considering the context of the entire statute, 62
the dissent concluded that “owners” must actually mean “owners of
assessable property.” 63
IV. ANALYSIS
The court’s holding in Brainerd Investments Partnership, in
addition to confirming that the statute is not ambiguous, highlights
two policy issues that arise from the court’s interpretation and the
underlying structure of Minnesota’s special assessment statute.
First, because the State has the power to petition for improvements,
private landowners neighboring state-owned property may, subject
to approval by elected officials, be powerless to avoid special
assessments if the State decides to petition for improvements under
the thirty-five percent rule.64 Second, because municipalities cannot
levy binding assessments against the State, cities are at risk of being
left with no means of paying for large structural improvements that
the State has asked them to undertake and for which the city is
powerless to bind the State to pay. 65
59. Brainerd Invs. P’ship, 827 N.W.2d at 758 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
60. A unanimity petition is one signed by all owners of land abutting the
proposed improvement in which they all agree to pay the full amount of the
assessment. See M INN. STAT. § 429.031, subdiv. 3.
61. Brainerd Invs. P’ship, 827 N.W.2d at 760 (citing M INN. STAT. § 429.031,
subdiv. 3).
62. Brainerd Invs. P’ship, 827 N.W.2d at 759 (“Our case law mandates that we
look at [the statute] ‘as a whole and interpret each section in light of the
surrounding sections to avoid conflicting interpretations.’” (citing Eng’g & Constr.
Innovations, Inc. v. L.H. Buldoc Co., 825 N.W.2d 695, 711 (Minn. 2013)));
see also M INN. STAT. § 645.16 (“The object of all interpretation and construction of
laws is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature. Every law shall
be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions.”).
63. Brainerd Invs. P’ship, 827 N.W.2d at 760.
64. See id. at 758.
65. That private landowners would be fearful of solidifying the power to
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Furthermore, empowering the State to petition causes tension
between local and state priorities because of the potential to leave
either the private owner or the municipality with the bill if the State
refuses payment. 66 On the other hand, simply allowing the State to
petition does not commit municipalities or private landowners to a
project. 67 A petition submitted under section 429.031 does not
negate other protections built into the special assessment statutes. 68
Municipal city councils may still choose not to approve the
project, 69 and private landowners may still challenge special
assessments under the special benefits test or on procedural
grounds. 70
A. The Question of Ambiguity
While it may be tempting to frame the Brainerd Investments
Partnership decision around fairness to private landowners, the
court’s decision to leave such policy questions to the legislature
appears to be a common approach. 71 What is more, this approach
provides an opening for the legislature to take a broader look at
the statute and consider the impact of the current framework when
municipalities and the State do not cooperate. The court’s decision
in Brainerd Investments Partnership came down to the threshold
petition for special assessments makes sense because the State may elect not to pay
its portion of the very assessment for which it petitioned. See M INN. STAT. § 435.19,
subdiv. 2.
66. See infra text accompanying notes 135–43.
67. See M INN. STAT. § 429.061 (outlining required special assessment
procedures).
68. See id. § 429.031, subdiv. 1(f); infra text accompanying notes 69–70.
69. M INN. STAT. § 429.031, subdiv. 1(f) (“[T]he improvement may be adopted
at any time within six months after the date of the hearing by vote of a majority of
all members of the council . . . .” (emphasis added)).
70. See id. § 429.061 (explaining the special benefits test); id. § 429.031,
subdiv. 1 (requiring a published plan, notice, and public hearing before special
assessments can be levied). See generally 16B AM. JUR. 2D Legal Forms § 236:1 (2009)
(“Special or local assessments may be levied for a wide range of purposes,
providing that the improvement for which the assessment is levied confers a
benefit to the property assessed, which is . . . special to the property rather than
general to the community as a whole.”); 70C AM. JUR. 2D Special or Local Assessments
§ 29 (2011) (“A legislative body cannot by its fiat make a local improvement of that
which in its essence is not such an improvement, and it cannot by its fiat make a
special benefit to sustain a special assessment where there is no special benefit.”).
71. See, e.g., City of Phoenix v. State ex rel Harless, 117 P.2d 87 (Ariz. 1941);
City of Phoenix v. Wilson, 5 P.2d 411 (Ariz. 1931); Esling v. Krambeck, 663 N.W.2d
671 (S.D. 2003); Pappas v. Richfield City, 962 P.2d 63 (Utah 1998); Armstrong v.
Ogden City, 43 P. 119 (Utah 1895), aff’d, 168 U.S. 224 (1897).
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question of whether Minnesota Statutes section 435.19 is
ambiguous. 72 Both the majority and the dissent offer well-developed
arguments on this point. Had the appellants successfully
established that the statute was ambiguous, thereby allowing the
court to consider extrinsic sources in its interpretation, their
position would have been much stronger and more persuasive due
to the important policy questions in play and the inequities
inherent in the plain interpretation of the statute. 73
Justice Anderson argues that relying on the common meaning
of the word “owner” causes the word to have two different
meanings within the same statute because if the State is an owner
within the meaning of the statute it would be impossible to obtain a
valid unanimity petition. 74 This may not be as natural a conclusion
as Justice Anderson determines it is. Minnesota Statutes section
429.031, subdivision 3 does not explicitly state that a unanimity
petition may not be signed by the State; 75 rather, it says “[w]henever
all owners of real property abutting upon any street named as the
location of any improvement shall petition the council to construct
the improvement and to assess the entire cost against their
property, the council may . . . adopt a resolution . . . ordering that
improvement.” 76 Thus, the statute requires (1) that all owners of
property abutting the street named as the location of the
improvement sign the petition; and (2) that they agree that the
entire cost of the project shall be assessed against their property. 77
The dissent’s interpretation of the statute requires an inference
that the State may not be voluntarily assessed. 78
72. City of Brainerd v. Brainerd Invs. P’ship, 827 N.W.2d 752, 757 (Minn.
2013).
73. Id. at 758 (“We acknowledge that the current statutory framework grants
the State discretion to determine if, and how much, it should be assessed. We also
recognize that interpreting the word ‘owner’ to include the State could reduce the
ability of private landowners to prevent improvements if they own property
adjacent to state-owned land.”).
74. Id. at 761 (Anderson, J., dissenting). Justice Anderson quotes section
435.19, subdivision 2 of the Minnesota Statutes, reasoning that “to have a valid
unanimity petition, ‘all owners’ upon which the ‘entire cost’ can be assessed must
sign the petition.” Id. Thus, because the State cannot be assessed, they may not
sign a unanimity petition. Id.
75. M INN. STAT. § 429.031, subdiv. 3.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. In some jurisdictions, if an entity or party voluntarily pays an assessment,
the payment does not qualify as an assessment because an assessment is a tax and
taxes are, by definition, involuntary. See, e.g., Pappas v. Richfield City, 962 P.2d 63
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In support of its argument, the dissent relied on the Supreme
Court of Utah’s decision in Armstrong v. Ogden City. 79 In that case,
Ogden City created an improvement district for street repavement,
which included 660 frontage feet owned by the city and used for
the city hall. 80 The court found that the city did not have
jurisdiction to create the improvement district because the owners
of more than fifty percent of the front footage objected to the
proposal within the time required. 81 Though the statute did not
require the signatures of fifty percent of the assessable owners, the
court concluded that city property should not be included in the
calculation of the percentage of protests. 82 The Ogden court
decided the case on policy grounds, rather than the plain meaning
of the statute, opining that otherwise “the statute would become
inoperative.” 83 In fact, the statute would not become inoperative;
rather, it would operate in a way that the court thought “would
produce great injustice.” 84
In Brainerd Investments Partnership, the majority did not agree
with this reasoning. Instead, the court concluded that although
(Utah 1998). It is not clear whether this is the law in Minnesota. See Oral
Argument at 26:35, 58:25, City of Brainerd v. Brainerd Invs. P’ship, 827 N.W.2d
752 (Minn. 2013) (No. A11-644, -1471), available at http://www.tpt.org/courts
/MNJudicialBranchvideo_NEW.php?number=A110644. It is also not clear whether
or why a voluntary assessment paid by the State would not qualify as an assessment
within the meaning of the statute, while a voluntary assessment paid by private
landowners, who demonstrate their voluntary agreement by signing a petition,
must qualify to give any meaning at all to the provision. Furthermore, the phrase
“assessed against their property” could be interpreted to refer to the property
collectively, without regard to how the assessment is divided. See M INN. STAT.
§ 435.19, subdiv. 3.
79. 43 P. 119 (Utah 1895).
80. Id. at 120. This case is distinguishable from Brainerd Investments Partnership
because (1) the city was petitioning itself; and (2) the city did not contribute any
funds toward the project.
81. Id. at 120–21.
82. Id. at 120 (citing Utah’s special assessment statute, which prohibited
creation of an improvement district “[i]f at or before the time fixed written
objections to such improvements [are] signed by the owners of one half of the
front feet abutting upon that portion of the street.” (emphasis added)).
83. See id. at 121.
84. Id. (“If, for instance, the city council should create a paving district out of
the four portions of streets that surround a square used exclusively for city
purposes, it would only be necessary to secure the consent of the owner of a single
front foot of property abutting upon the opposite side of the street from the
public square to abstain from protesting, and the remaining frontage would not
only be powerless to prevent the improvement, but would be compelled to pay
practically the entire expense.”). While it is true that this might seem unfair, it
does not render the statute inoperative.
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definitions of ‘owner’ that differ from the plain meaning could
yield other reasonable interpretations, because application of the
plain meaning resulted in only one reasonable interpretation, the
statute was not ambiguous. 85 Thus, the court declined to consider
interpretations that required using a definition other than the
plain meaning, as well as extrinsic sources such as the attorney
general opinions and legislative history. 86
B.

Support for the Plain Meaning Approach in Minnesota and in Other
Jurisdictions

Minnesota Statutes section 645.16 supports the plain meaning
approach to the interpretation adopted by the majority. That
statute states, “When the words of a law in their application to an
existing situation are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of
the law shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the
spirit.” 87 Several recent Minnesota Supreme Court cases have relied
on this portion of section 645.16 to interpret other statutes and
have come to conclusions that parallel the holding in Brainerd
Investments Partnership. 88
85. City of Brainerd v. Brainerd Invs. P’ship., 827 N.W.2d 752, 757
(Minn. 2013). Another possible interpretation of subdivision 3 is that it limits the
ability of private landowners whose land abuts state land to petition at all.
Appellants’ Brief, Addendum and Appendix, supra note 26, at 30. Alternatively, it
could mean that a petition signed by all of the neighbors but not the public entity
is unanimous, or that the legislature intended that the State be able to sign a
unanimous petition, just like any other owner, as long as it agreed to pay its share
of the assessment. But see Cities & Villages—Streets—Improvements of, 56 Op.
Minn. Att’y Gen. 133, 134 (June 30, 1936). The latter interpretation seems to
make sense in the context of the statute because it creates an explicit purpose for
Minnesota Statutes section 435.19, which provides that the city may determine the
amount the State would pay if it were assessable.
86. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
87. M INN. STAT. § 645.16 (2012).
88. See, e.g., N. States Power v. Aleckson, 831 N.W.2d 303, 309 (Minn. 2013)
(quoting M INN. STAT. § 645.16) (“When a statute’s language is ‘clear and free from
all ambiguity, the letter of the law shall not be disregarded under the pretext of
pursuing the spirit.”); Caldas v. Affordable Granite & Stone, Inc., 820 N.W.2d 826,
836 (Minn. 2012) (“If the language of the statute is clear and free from ambiguity,
the court’s role is to enforce the language of the statute and not explore the spirit
or purpose of the law.”); Abrahamson v. St. Louis Cnty. Sch. Dist., 819 N.W.2d 129,
134 (Minn. 2012) (“Given that the Legislature has specifically designated school
districts as public corporations, . . . excluding school districts from the definition
of ‘corporation’ . . . simply because other statutes refer separately to ‘corporations’
and ‘school districts’ ignores the plain meaning of [the statute].” (citations
omitted)); Krummenacher v. City of Minnetonka, 783 N.W.2d 721, 726
(Minn. 2010) (“If the law is ‘clear and free from all ambiguity,’ the plain meaning

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2013

13

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 11

2013]

A STATUTORY DEFINITION OF “OWNER”

369

Other jurisdictions also interpret statutes that deal with
petitions made by landowners in much the same way as Minnesota.
For example, the South Dakota Supreme Court decided a similar
case, involving a petition to annex land, based on a plain language
reading of that statute. In Esling v. Krambeck 89 the county presented
a voluntary petition to the City of Spearfish to annex certain county
lands, including a public airport, and make them part of the city. 90
South Dakota law requires that the owners of at least three-fourths
of the value of the land proposed to be annexed sign the petition. 91
A group of citizens challenged the sufficiency of the petition
arguing, among other things, “that the term ‘value’ in [the relevant
statute] means only the ‘assessed value’ of real property subject to
voluntary annexation” 92
Ultimately, the court found that value did not mean “assessed
value” and upheld the sufficiency of the petition, stating, “SDCL 94-1 does not expressly state that the ‘value of the territory’ must be
the assessed value. If the legislature had intended to limit ‘value’ to
‘assessed value,’ it certainly could have done so.” 93
Thus, under a plain meaning interpretation of the statute, the
court interpreted “value” according to its common meaning. The
court noted that courts in other jurisdictions had found that the
assessed value must be used in voluntary annexations; however, it
distinguished those cases on the basis that, unlike the South Dakota
Statute, “those cases all dealt with statutes that included the word
‘assessed’ or some variation of it.” 94

controls and is not disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the spirit.”
(citations omitted)).
89. Esling v. Krambeck, 663 N.W.2d 671 (S.D. 2003).
90. Id. at 674.
91. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 9-4-1 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.)
(“The governing body of a municipality, upon receipt of a written petition . . . may
by resolution include such territory or any part thereof within such municipality if
the petition is signed by not less than three-fourths of the registered voters and by
the owners of not less than three-fourths of the value of the territory sought to be
annexed to the municipality.”).
92. Esling, 633 N.W.2d at 676.
93. Id. at 677. “The ordinary meaning of the term ‘value’ is ‘the monetary
worth or price of something; the amount of goods, services, or money that
something will command in an exchange.’” Id. at 676 (quoting BLACK’ S LAW
DICTIONARY 1549 (7th ed. 1999)).
94. Id. at 676 (citing City of Phoenix v. State, 117 P.2d 87 (Ariz. 1941));
People ex rel. Thain v. City of Palo Alto, 78 Cal. Rptr. 240 (Ct. App. 1969); Johnson
v. City of Spokane, 577 P.2d 164 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978).
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Utah confronted a similar problem of statutory construction
and resolved the question by relying on the plain language
approach. In Pappas v. Richfield City 95 the Supreme Court of Utah
was confronted with the question of whether land owned by a
school district, which was immune from special assessments, should
be counted in the calculation of assessable frontage to determine if
sufficient protests had been submitted in opposition to the creation
of a special improvement district (SID). 96 The school district
supported the project and had voluntarily agreed to pay an
assessment; however, a group of private landowners, following
statutory procedure, filed protests to the creation of the SID. 97
The statute required at least fifty percent of the owners of
assessable front footage to file protests within a certain period of
time to impede the creation of the district. 98 The city’s calculations
revealed that if the school district property was included in the
calculation of total front footage, the protests filed amounted to
only forty-five percent of the front footage, not sufficient to defeat
the SID. 99 But if the school district property was excluded, then the
protests would equal fifty-three percent of the front footage and
would defeat the SID. 100
The district court held that the city had properly included the
school district property in their calculations, but the Utah Supreme
Court overturned, relying on a literal reading of the statute. 101
[The] statute . . . provides that “the necessary number of
protests [to defeat a SID] means the aggregate of the
following: (i) protests representing one-half of the front
footage to be assessed where an assessment is proposed to
be made according to frontage.” The dispositive issue in
this case is therefore whether the school district property
was “to be assessed” within the meaning of 17A-3307(3)(b)(i). We hold that it was not because such
property is exempt from local assessments. 102
95. 962 P.2d 63 (Utah 1998).
96. Id. at 65.
97. See id. at 64–65.
98. Id. at 66 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 17A-3-307(3)(b)(i) (repealed 2007)).
99. Id. at 64.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 65–66.
102. Id. at 66 (second alteration in original) (citations omitted). The Pappas
court declined to adopt the city’s interpretation that Ogden stands for the narrow
proposition that land may be excluded from calculations only if the owner of
public property does not agree to pay its fair share of the assessments. Id. at 65.
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Thus, by applying the same plain language approach, the court
found for the private landowners because, unlike the Minnesota
statue, this Utah statute explicitly used the words “to be assessed.” 103
The Arizona Supreme Court has also interpreted that state’s
special assessment statute very literally. In City of Phoenix v. Wilson 104
the court was asked to determine whether a public park abutting
the proposed assessed area should be counted for the purpose of
determining whether sufficient protests had been signed in
opposition to the proposed improvement. 105 The court held that if
“public property is expressly exempted from a special improvement
assessment” that property should not be considered in determining
whether sufficient owners have protested against the assessment. 106
“[B]ut . . . where . . . the municipality has become obligated to pay
its proportionate share of the cost of the improvement . . . such
frontage should be included in passing upon this question.” 107 In so
holding, the court stated that “[t]he Legislature of Arizona . . . very
carefully provided . . . that when the proposed improvement was
ordered, unless the resolution of intention expressly excluded the
city property from the assessment, the municipality itself should be
liable for its proportionate share of the expenses.” 108
Instead, the court held that even a voluntary agreement by the school district to
pay an amount equal to the proposed assessment would not be sufficient
justification to count the school district’s property because a contractual payment
is not the same as an assessment, which is a tax. Id. at 66. Therefore, whether the
school district actually paid or not was irrelevant because the statute, literally
construed, designated that only assessable front footage is included in the
calculation. See id.
103. Id. at 66 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 17A-3-307(3)(b)(i)). This holding is
especially interesting in light of the fact that Utah is the jurisdiction that decided
Ogden, the case upon which the dissent and the Minnesota Attorney General rely
and which ignored the plain meaning of the statute in favor of equity.
See Armstrong v. Ogden City, 43 P. 119 (Utah 1895).
104. 5 P.2d 411 (Ariz. 1931).
105. Id. at 411 (finding that if a publicly owned park were counted in
determining the total frontage, the protests filed would be less than the statutorily
required fifty percent, but if the public land were not counted, the protests would
represent more than fifty percent of the total frontage in the district).
106. Id. at 413.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 412. In another Arizona case decided a decade later, the court held
that the school district was not qualified to sign a petition for annexation because
the district’s land was not subject to taxation or assessment. City of Phoenix v.
State ex rel. Harless, 117 P.2d 87, 88 (Ariz. 1941). The statute at issue stated that
the petition should be signed by “the owners of not less than one-half in value of
the property in any territory contiguous to the city, as shown by the last assessment
of said property.” Id. at 87. Because the property was not subject to taxation it was
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The interpretations by these various courts support the
Minnesota Supreme Court’s plain meaning interpretation of the
Minnesota statute; however, they also recognize in some way the
potential for injustice to the private landowner whose land abuts an
improvement also abutting publicly owned property. 109 It seems that
Utah, in Ogden City, is an outlier in that it decided the case on
grounds of equity rather than the rules of statutory construction. 110
C.

The Other Side of the Coin: The City of Moose Lake

Lack of a clear statutory mechanism for the city to bind the
state to pay special assessments can create inefficiency and waste for
both the city and the state, and can make it difficult for city leaders
to work with the state to make infrastructure improvements
benefiting state land. 111 One such recent case involved the City of
Moose Lake, Minnesota. In that case, the State backed out of an
agreement to help finance a major sewer system upgrade intended
primarily to benefit a state-run treatment center and prison,
forcing the city to cancel the final phase of construction and lose
substantial investments. 112
When a municipality decides to complete improvements that
will benefit state property, the municipality and state may choose to
negotiate a plan for the project and the amount the state will pay
toward the project. 113 These costs may be levied as voluntary special
assessments, or they may be paid through another financing
mechanism. 114 Sometimes, such as in Brainerd Investments
not on the assessment roll and, therefore, the owner of the property was not
eligible to petition. Id. at 89.
109. See Wilson, 5 P.2d at 412.
110. See Armstrong v. Ogden City, 43 P. 119, 121 (Utah 1895) (“[W]e think
that the establishment of such a rule would not only be wrong in principle and
wrong in theory, but it would also be contrary to the spirit and intention of the
statutes providing for special improvement assessments.”).
111. Telephone Interview with Theodore Shaw, Mayor, City of Moose Lake,
Minn. (Aug. 12, 2013) [hereinafter Interview with Mayor Shaw I].
112. See infra notes 135–37 and accompanying text.
113. See M INN. STAT. § 429.051 (2012); City of Brainerd v. Brainerd Invs.
P’ship, 827 N.W.2d 752 (Minn. 2013); LEAGUE OF M INN. CITIES, supra note 12,
at 29.
114. See generally 64 AM. JUR. 2D Public Securities and Obligations § 99 (noting
that the issuance of bonds is governed by state statute and bonds are usually
authorized “for the acquisition, construction, maintenance, improvement,
addition to, and operation of . . . ’public project[s]’”); Jeanette Behr, Infrastructure
Needs: Financing Infrastructure Improvements, M INN. CITIES M AG., Aug. 2009, at 6, 6,
available at http://www.lmc.org/media/document/1/financing_infrastructure.pdf
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Partnership, a municipality and the state may come to an agreement
and sign a contract binding the state to contribute some portion of
the cost of the project. 115 Other times, such as in the case of Moose
Lake, the process of voluntary contribution breaks down. Moose
Lake’s experience demonstrates the financial vulnerability of
municipalities and how a special assessment statute allowing
municipalities to bind the state, in the same way other landowners
are bound, could create security for municipalities, reduce
opportunities for wasteful reimbursement appropriations, and
reduce tension between the state and municipalities.
The City of Moose Lake is a small town in northern Minnesota
with a population of about 2751 people and a total area of 3.66
square miles. 116 The city is an important hub for Minnesota’s state
park system, 117 and it is also home to two state-run facilities,
including a prison operated by the Minnesota Department of
Corrections (DOC), 118 and a treatment center for sex offenders
called the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP). 119
(“Cities can generate funds for infrastructure projects in a variety of ways,
including issuing debt (bonds) or certificates of indebtedness; levying property
taxes; charging service fees; using development agreements; using statutory
financing tools such as special assessments; and using land use-related funding.”)
115. Brainerd Invs. P’ship, 827 N.W.2d at 752.
116. John Hall, Census Data for Moose Lake, ROADSIDE THOUGHTS,
http://www.roadsidethoughts.com/mn/moose-lake-census.html (last modified
Nov. 5, 2013); Moose Lake City, Minnesota, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/community_facts.xhtml
(search “Moose Lake”) (last visited Dec. 10, 2013).
117. The city’s parks serve as a trailhead for the Willard-Munger trail system
that stretches 159 miles from the city of Duluth all the way to the cities of
Minneapolis and Saint Paul and several regionally significant snowmobile and bike
trails. See State Trails, M INN. DEP’ T NAT. RESOURCES, http://www.dnr.state.mn.us
/state_trails/willard_munger/index.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2013); see also Find a
State Trail by Location, M INN. DEP’ T NAT. RESOURCES, http://www.dnr.state.mn.us
/state_trails/map.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2013).
118. Facility Information: Willow River/Moose Lake, M INN. DEP’ T CORRECTIONS,
http://www.doc.state.mn.us/facilities/willowriver.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2013)
(stating a total population of 1045 inmates as of September 16, 2013).
119. Minnesota Sex Offender Program Overview, M INN. DEP’ T HUM. SERVICES,
http://mn.gov/dhs/ (follow “A-Z Topics” hyperlink; then follow “MN Sex
Offender Program” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 13, 2013) (“The Minnesota Sex
Offender Program (MSOP) provides services to individuals who have been courtordered to receive sex offender treatment. MSOP clients have completed their
prison sentences and are civilly committed by the courts and placed in sex
offender treatment for an indeterminate period of time. A civil court may commit
a person for sex offender treatment if a judge determines that the individual is
a ’sexual psychopathic personality,’ a ‘sexually dangerous person,’ or both.”).
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The prison houses approximately 1050 inmates, and it is
located within the city limits on state-owned land. 120 The MSOP
facility houses approximately 503 civilly committed individuals who
have completed prison sentences for sex-related crimes but who
have been deemed too dangerous to release. 121 Thus, over half of
the population of Moose Lake is institutionalized. 122 Both the
prison and treatment center depend on the city for various
infrastructure needs. 123 Specifically, because the combined facilities
house approximately fifty-six percent of the total population, they
are the largest users of the city’s sewer collection system and
municipal electric utility. 124
Approximately eighty-one percent of the land within the city
limits of Moose Lake is tax exempt. 125 About fifty percent of that is
state-owned land. 126 Because the city’s tax base comes from around
twenty-five percent of the land area and less than fifty percent of
the population, 127 which is equal to about 650 households, the city
is challenged to spread those tax dollars to maintain infrastructure
across the entire city. 128
In 2005, the DOC and MSOP approached the City of Moose
Lake about increasing the city’s sewer system capacity to
120. See Bill Authorizing the City of Moose Lake to Impose a Local Sales and Use Tax:
Hearing on S.F. 1053 Before the Tax Reform Div. of the S. Tax Comm.,
88th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2013) [hereinafter Hearing], available at http://www
.senate.leg.state.mn.us/media/media_video_popup.php?flv=cmte_taxesreform
_040413.flv (statement of Theodore Shaw, Mayor, City of Moose Lake); Facility
Information, supra note 118.
121. Minnesota Sex Offender Program Statistics, M INN. DEP’ T HUM.
SERVICES (Oct. 2, 2013), http://www.dhs.state.mn.us/main/idcplg?IdcService
=GET_DYNAMIC_CONVERSION&RevisionSelectionMethod=LatestReleased&
dDocName=dhs16_151535.
122. This estimate includes inmates at the two state-run incarceration
facilities, as well as those residing in either a nursing home or hospital located
inside the city limits. See Hearing, supra note 120 (statement of Tom Paul, Flood
Manager, City of Moose Lake).
123. Interview with Mayor Shaw I, supra note 111.
124. Id. In addition to connecting to the city’s sewer collection system and
electric utility, the facilities require fire and police service from the city. Id.
The city expends substantial police resources at the MSOP facility because, due to
the nature of the program, guards are prohibited from carrying firearms. Id.
125. Moose Lake City Council Minutes 6 (Mar. 14, 2007), available at http://
www.cityofmooselake.com/resources/Archived_Minutes/March%202007.docx;
Interview with Mayor Shaw I, supra note 111.
126. See Hearing, supra note 120 (statement of Theodore Shaw, Mayor, City of
Moose Lake).
127. See id.
128. See id. (statement of Tom Paul, Flood Manager, City of Moose Lake).
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accommodate projected growth at both facilities. 129 Although the
city’s need for additional capacity was not great at the time, the
mayor and city council decided to move forward with the project
because the state facilities are major employers in the region and,
as such, are of significant economic benefit to the city. 130
Over a period of several months, the city worked with the DOC
and MSOP to create a Wastewater Collection and Facility
Treatment Plan, which incorporated twenty-year growth
projections submitted by the city, the DOC, MSOP, and the
surrounding sewer district. 131 Upon completion of the plan, in
February of 2007, the city obtained state approval for the project,
secured funding, and began construction. 132 During the planning
stage, the Mayor of Moose Lake and the city administrator
attempted to negotiate a signed contract with the DOC to bind the
State to contribute to the project; however, the State refused to sign
a contract, stating that it could not bind future legislatures to debt
payments. 133 Nevertheless, the city was assured of the State’s
commitment to payment through increased water-use rates, which
would be paid periodically until the agreed upon amount was paid
in full. 134

129. Telephone Interview with Theodore Shaw, Mayor, City of Moose Lake,
Minn. (Aug. 19, 2013) [hereinafter Interview with Mayor Shaw II]; see also Moose
Lake City Council Minutes 7 (June 13, 2007), available at http://www
.cityofmooselake.com/resources/Archived_Minutes/June%202007.doc;
Interview with Mayor Shaw I, supra note 111.
130. Interview with Mayor Shaw II, supra note 129.
131. See Hearing, supra note 120 (statement of Theodore Shaw, Mayor, City of
Moose Lake). The Wastewater Collection and Treatment Facilities Plan was a
requirement of the State Public Financing Administration. The funding of the
project was based on projections submitted by the city, the sewer district, and the
state agencies involved.
132. Interview with Mayor Shaw I, supra note 111. The project was divided into
three phases. According to Mayor Shaw, the city alone did not need the increased
capacity, and in 2007, while the city was meeting with the Minnesota Pollution
Control Agency, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Natural
Resources, various legislative committees, and the Public Finance Agency to secure
the necessary permits and funding, the State wrote a letter to the city encouraging
them to include the second and third phases of the project to accommodate the
State’s needs. Id. Phase one was designed to upgrade and repair the city’s current
system. Id. Phases two and three were designed to increase capacity to
accommodate the State’s projected needs. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.; Moose Lake City Council Minutes (Sept. 9, 2009), available at
http://www.cityofmooselake.com/resources/Archived_Minutes/September
%202009.docx.
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At various points after construction began, MSOP approached
the city to adjust the plan due to changes in its own proposed
timeline for expansion. 135 During 2010, the city and the DOC
attempted to negotiate rate increases to cover the cost of the
project 136 but were unable to agree on an acceptable rate. 137 Finally,
in February of 2011, MSOP informed the city that it did not foresee
a time when it would expand to its previously projected levels and,
therefore, it would no longer connect to the new line that was built
to accommodate its previously predicted needs. 138 The city
immediately cancelled the final phase of the project, but was left
with nearly $900,000 worth of damages, plus the cost of the alreadycompleted portion. 139 MSOP ultimately decided not to complete its
own planned updates and, therefore, never hooked up to the new
sewer line the city built for its use, which was capped and sits
unused adjacent to the state-owned property. 140

135. Interview with Mayor Shaw I, supra note 111. The city reacted to these
changes by adjusting the timeline for phase three of the project and renegotiating
water rates. Id. The State eventually rejected the proposed rates and the parties
negotiated a settlement in mediation. See Moose Lake City Council Minutes
(Mar. 14, 2012), available at http://www.cityofmooselake.com/resources/2012
_Minutes/March%202012 .docx.
136. Moose Lake City Council Minutes (Nov. 10, 2010), available at http://
www.cityofmooselake.com/resources/2010_Minutes/November%202010.doc.
137. Interview with Mayor Shaw I, supra note 111; see Moose Lake City Council
Minutes (Mar. 14, 2008), supra note 135.
138. Moose Lake City Council Minutes (Feb. 9, 2011), available at http://www
.cityofmooselake.com/resources/2011_Minutes/February%202011.doc
(“Leadership from DOC stated that there would not be growth at the Moose Lake
facility for the next 30 years. DHS indicated that despite the second phase being
under construction at the MSOP facility no additional flow would be added to the
city’s wastewater system. City Administrator Vahlsing stated to the state officials
that construction was well underway for the lagoon expansion. He also stated that
the expansion was implemented due to state needs and that the state could not
arbitrarily change it’s [sic] projections and expect not to pay for it’s [sic] portion
of the expansion.”).
139. Interview with Mayor Shaw I, supra note 111. Damages included unpaid
water bills and the costs of a pond expansion design, construction mobilization,
plan modification due to DOCs withdrawal, wetland credits and permits
purchased, and land purchased for additional treatment ponds. Id. According to
Mayor Shaw, if the city had not received reimbursement from the State for the cost
of the first two phases of the project and the 650 taxpaying households in the city
had borne the entire cost, the City of Moose Lake would have had some of the
highest sewer rates in the country. Id.
140. See Hearing, supra note 120 (statement of Theodore Shaw, Mayor, City of
Moose Lake).
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Moose Lake’s sewer expansion project had an estimated cost
of $5.1 million. 141 Approximately $1.5 million of that was directly
attributable to the new sewer line built to accommodate the State’s
facilities. 142 An additional $3.775 million was spent to prepare the
city’s system for the State’s increased capacity. 143 When
municipalities undertake projects of this magnitude, they need
assurance that each source of funding is reliable. In Moose Lake’s
case, the city was unable to extract a legal promise to pay from the
State. 144 The city planned and completed the project based on
projections provided by the State and an agreement that the State
would help pay for the project. 145 City officials never imagined that
the State, which approached the city to begin the project in the
first place, would or could back out on its financial commitment. 146
Providing a clear statutory mechanism for the city to bind the
State prior to beginning work on Moose Lake’s sewer project would
have (1) reduced or avoided the tension created between the city
and the State, thus encouraging future cooperation; (2) conserved
state resources invested in planning, approving, permitting, and
funding a project that was never completed; and (3) avoided
payment of a $2 million reimbursement grant 147 for which the State
will see no return. Instead of the reimbursement grant, a
comparable sum would have been spent over a period of time in
exchange for increased sewer capacity at the state facilities. 148
Since this controversy, city leadership in Moose Lake has
determined that it is in the city’s best interests to require the State
to allocate funds in advance for any infrastructure or public utility
upgrades it requires. 149 Other cities also have had problems
141. Moose Lake City Council Minutes 7 (June 13, 2007), supra note 129.
142. Interview with Pat Oman, Moose Lake City Adm’r., in Moose Lake, Minn.
(Aug. 19, 2013).
143. Id.
144. Interview with Mayor Shaw I, supra note 111. The city requested a
contract but was told that the State could not bind the legislature to future debt
payments. Id.
145. Moose Lake City Council Minutes (Feb. 9, 2011), supra note 138.
146. Interview with Mayor Shaw I, supra note 111.
147. Act of May 23, 2013, ch. 143, art. 4, § 49, 2013 Minn. Laws 1969, 2018
(appropriating $2 million to Moose Lake as reimbursement for a portion of the
loss produced by the city’s reliance).
148. Interview with Mayor Shaw I, supra note 111.
149. Id. After the DOC backed out of the sewer project, it informed the city
that it needed increased electrical capacity and asked the city to install a new
transformer at a cost of around $700,000. Id. The city declined and required the
State to make the investment up front. Id.
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obtaining financial commitments from the State for improvement
projects. The City of Minneapolis has a policy of never assessing the
State or other political subdivision. 150 Other cities assess the State,
only to never receive payment. For example, the City of
Robbinsdale, a suburb of Minneapolis, has levied special
assessments on land owned by the Minnesota Department of
Transportation for improvements abutting developable land owned
by the State, 151 but the State simply has not paid the assessments. 152
The State of Minnesota owns about seventeen percent of the
land within the state borders, or about 8.4 million acres. 153 Much of
that land is dedicated to state parks and forests, however, other
state agencies, such as the Department of Transportation, the
Minnesota State Colleges and Universities systems, and the
Department of Human Services also own and manage land around
the state. 154 By amending this statute, or creating an alternative
mechanism for municipalities to bind the State, the legislature
could help increase certainty of repayment, increase efficiency,
reduce wasted efforts on projects that will later be cancelled, and
build trust and cooperation between the State and municipalities.
D. Dealing with the Problem
There are various possible ways to deal with the policy issues
surrounding Minnesota’s special assessment statute. During the
2013 legislative session, Senator Rod Skoe, of northwestern
Minnesota, proposed an amendment to Minnesota’s special
assessment statute that would allow municipalities to bind the State
to pay special assessments. 155 The amendment would have
empowered municipalities to bind the State, while allowing the
State to maintain the ability to negotiate the amount of the

150. Telephone Interview with Suzette Hjermstad, Supervisor, Minneapolis
Pub. Works Special Assessment Office (Aug. 15, 2013).
151. The city did not attempt to assess undevelopable land. Telephone
Interview with Marcia Glick, City Manager, City of Robbinsdale, Minn.
(Aug. 14, 2013).
152. Interview with William A. Blonigan, City Councilmember, City of
Robbinsdale, Minn., in Robbinsdale, Minn. (Aug. 1, 2013).
153. JOHN HELLAND, M INN. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES RESEARCH DEP’ T, STATE OWNED LAND IN M INN. 1 (2002), available at http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd
/pubs/ss/sssoland.pdf.
154. See id.
155. S.F. 552, 88th Leg., Reg. Sess. art. 2, § 33 (Minn. 2013).
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assessment. 156 Additionally, the amendment would have required
the State to make an annual appropriation to pay such special
assessments. 157
An amendment allowing municipalities to bind the State
would provide an advantage to municipalities, but it is difficult to
know what the actual cost of such an amendment would be to the
State. 158 In the absence of this option, municipalities have learned
to fund their projects without relying on the State, which makes it
especially difficult to gather reliable data on how much
municipalities would rely on this option if it were available. 159 In a
survey conducted by the League of Minnesota Cities, thirty-nine of
fifty-six cities responded that they have not tried to assess the State
during the last ten years. Seventeen others responded that they had
tried to assess the State. Of those, eight stated that the State refused
to pay the assessment; only one reported an assessment successfully
collected. 160
Additionally, the 2013 proposed amendment provides little
procedural guidance for the negotiation process employed when
the State disputes the amount of an assessment levied, nor does it
appoint a definitive decision maker to turn to when the parties
cannot reach an agreement. 161 One way to solve these problems is
to avoid negotiation by creating a custom special benefit test or a
calculation procedure for assessing the State. 162
156. Id.
157. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 38. But see City of Fargo v. State,
260 N.W.2d 333, 336–38 (N.D. 1977) (holding that even with a statutory mandate,
it is impossible to require the State to pay assessments because the State relies on
appropriation to pay). See generally 64 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 1752 (2011)
(“Since property in public use cannot be sold for delinquent assessments,
collection may be enforced only by a judgment against the public body controlling
the property or by an order for it to levy taxes to meet assessments if necessary.”).
158. Telephone Interview with Patrick Hynes, Intergovernmental Relations
Representative, League of Minn. Cities (July 19, 2013); Telephone Interview with
Steve Peterson, Senate Tax Comm. Analyst, State of Minn. (July 19, 2013). On the
other hand, the State would still have the ability to negotiate the amount due,
thereby controlling the cost. S.F. 552 art. 2, § 33.
159. Telephone Interview with Steve Peterson, supra note 158.
160. League of Minnesota Cities, State Payments Survey Data 9-17 (Sept. 17,
2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). One of the respondents
reported an outstanding assessment of over $336,000 dating back to 1985. Id.
161. S.F. 552 art. 2, § 33 (“The [State] may, after consultation and agreement
by the governing body of the city or town, pay an amount less than the amount
determined.”).
162. Cf. M INN. STAT. § 473.334 (2012) (defining specific guidelines to
determine the special benefits received by regional recreation open space
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The solution might be as straightforward as appointing a
binding decision maker and adding parameters to guide judicial
discretion. 163 These additions would allow the State to maintain the
ability to negotiate a lower amount and would provide a framework
for the decision maker to apply where the parties cannot agree on
an acceptable assessment amount. Alternatively, the legislature
could add a provision to the special assessment statutes explicitly
granting the State the ability to consent to special assessments,
thereby eliminating any question of whether a consenting state
owner is an owner under all sections of the statute. This would
allow municipalities to bind the State once an agreement is
reached, it would allow the State to maintain its ability to negotiate
with municipalities, and it would nullify the policy concerns raised
by the private landowners in Brainerd Investments Partnership. 164
V. CONCLUSION
The problem of whether or not to include the State in the
definition of “owner” under Minnesota Statutes section 435.19 has
come a long way since the attorney general interpretations of the
statute. The $9.45 million project 165 at issue in Brainerd Investments
Partnership is far removed from the construction of sanitary sewers,
curbs, and gutters that were at issue when the attorney general
weighed in. 166 The relationship between the State and
municipalities is complex when it comes to the task of completing
infrastructure improvements, and it is not uncommon for these
projects to involve substantial funds from various sources. 167 As
property).
163. See, e.g., id. § 282.01 (appointing the county board to determine the
amount of special benefit conferred on tax-forfeited lands).
164. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 153A-205(c) (West, Westlaw through 2013
Reg. Sess.) (stating that state-owned property may be considered in calculating
frontage and number of owners only if the State has consented to the assessment).
165. Jessi Pierce, 2012 Year in Review: No. 4-College Drive Project Complete,
BRAINERD DISPATCH (Dec. 21, 2012), http://brainerddispatch.com/extra/2012-12
-21/no-4-college-drive-project-complete.
166. Special Assessments—Property Owned by the State, 408-c Op. Minn. Att’y
Gen. 1, 1–2 (Oct. 28, 1954) (regarding laying water and sanitary sewer lines);
Cities: Improvements—Sewer, 387b-10 Op. Minn. Att’y Gen. 1, 4 (June 29, 1954)
(regarding construction of a sewer); Cities & Villages—Streets—Improvement of,
56 Op. Minn. Att’y Gen. 133, 133 (June 30, 1936) (regarding construction of six
blocks of “tarvia, curb, and gutter” improvements).
167. See, e.g., Respondent’s Brief and Appendix, supra note 48, at 5 n.3
(“The estimated $6.9 million cost of the Project is to be funded as follows: Federal
$2,234,300 State Aid $3,809,918 BPU $193,700 Crow Wing County $40,882 Local

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2013

25

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 11

2013]

A STATUTORY DEFINITION OF “OWNER”

381

such, changing the definition of “owner” to “assessable owner” does
little to solve the underlying problem that the State may refuse to
pay special assessments. 168 In the context of this larger problem,
whether the State petitions for the improvements, requests them
informally, or opposes them is a drop in the bucket.
The court correctly declined to add words to the statute;
instead, it left the policy issues raised in Brainerd Investments
Partnership to the legislature. 169 Perhaps the most important
outcome of this decision is that it draws attention to the possibility
of amending the statute in some manner to give municipalities the
ability to bind the State to pay special assessments, which would
relieve private landowners from the anxiety of having to wonder
whether their omnipotent State neighbor might petition for an
improvement with no intention to pony up. Furthermore, such an
amendment would give municipalities security when they develop
and complete expensive infrastructure improvements that provide
a special benefit to the State.
On the other hand, the holding in Brainerd Investments
Partnership is narrow, as it applies only to the status of the State as
an owner. 170 Perhaps the appellants’ argument that the court’s
decision has eliminated any line of defense against the use of
special assessments that serve a non-local purpose goes too far. 171
After all, the argument fails to acknowledge the most powerful and
important tool the private landowner has that the State does not—
the ability to elect municipal representatives; if private landowners
are not satisfied with the decisions of their city council, they may
Cost share $621,200[.]”).
168. See M INN. STAT. § 435.19.
169. City of Brainerd v. Brainerd Invs. P’ship., 827 N.W.2d 752, 756 (Minn.
2013).
170. Id. at 758.
171. Appellants’ Brief, Addendum and Appendix, supra note 26, at 30.
Appellants contended that this holding empowers a state instrumentality situated
across from property zoned for development to “decide to impede that
development by refusing to sign a petition for improvements even though the
State intends to refuse to make any voluntary payment towards the project.” Id.
Accordingly,
Private property owners who live in areas with large swaths of stateowned property could not petition for public improvements without
the consent of the State of Minnesota, even if the State is not going to
be assessed. Conversely, the State could petition for assessments against
private property owners on items where the State’s goal is to serve a
non-local purpose, while keeping the State’s costs at a minimum.
Id. at 30.
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vote them out. Additionally, despite the fact that a council may not
bind the State by use of special assessments, the many other
controls of Minnesota Statutes chapter 429 will still shield the
process. 172 Finally, cities may still obtain a voluntary contractual
commitment from the State, as the City of Brainerd did in this case
to fund its road improvement project. 173
That private landowners and attorneys general have been
pointing out this inequity for nearly 100 years 174 speaks to the
legitimacy of the landowners’ complaints. Whether the legislature
will attempt to unravel this complicated relationship between
municipalities and the State remains to be seen; however, by
upholding the controversial plain meaning of this statute, the
supreme court has provided the perfect window of opportunity for
the legislature to take a hard look at the structure of the statute and
at its implications on municipal financing.

172. See, e.g., M INN. STAT. § 429.031, subdiv. 1(a) (“Before the municipality
awards a contract for an improvement . . . or before the municipality may assess
any portion of the cost of an improvement . . . the council shall hold a public
hearing on the proposed improvement following two publications in the
newspaper of a notice . . . .”); id. § 429.031, subdiv. 1(b) (“Before the adoption of a
resolution . . . the council shall secure . . . a report advising it in a preliminary way
as to whether the proposed improvement is necessary, cost-effective, and
feasible . . . . The report must also include the estimated cost of the improvement
as recommended. A reasonable estimate of the total amount to be assessed, and a
description of the methodology used to calculate individual assessments for
affected parcels, must be available at the hearing.”).
173. Respondent’s Brief and Appendix, supra note 48, at 7–8.
174. See, e.g., Cities & Villages—Streets—Improvement of, 56 Op. Minn. Att’y
Gen. 133, 133 (June 30, 1936).
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